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State v. Evans: 
A Warrantless Search Incident to Arrest Is Constitutional, Regardless of Whether 
the Police Intend to Charge the Defendant Upon Apprehension 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a search 
incident to a valid arrest is 
constitutional even where the police 
had no intention of immediately 
charging the suspect. State v. Evans, 
352 Md. 496, 732 A.2d 469 (1999). 
The court ruled that the trial judge may 
not exclude certain cocaine evidence 
seized from two accused drug dealers 
when the police detained and 
searched, but did not "book" them for 
possession of illegal drugs. In so 
doing, the court concluded that, for a 
valid arrest, the police need only 
subject a defendant to the officers' 
immediate control, based on probable 
cause that the suspect committed a 
crime. The court reiterated its 
position that requiring the police to 
intend a formal prosecution of all 
apprehended suspects would lead to 
the needless waste of police and 
judicial resources. 
In Evans, the court consolidated 
two cases, State v. Evans and State 
v. Sykes-Bey, both having similar facts 
and identical issues. Evans, 352 Md. 
at 501, 732 A.2d at 424. In June of 
1994, as part of a police task force 
to fight drug activity in Baltimore City, 
an undercover officer purchased 
drugs from defendant Dwight Evans 
("Evans"). Id. at 501, 732 A.2d at 
425. Approximately five to ten 
minutes after the transaction, other 
members of the task force stopped 
and searched Evans, seizing cocaine 
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and marked money used in the 
undercover deal. Id. Although the 
police detained Evans to verify his 
identity, they did not transport him to 
the police station or bring him before 
a court commissioner, but instead, 
released him. Id. at 502, 732 A.2d 
at 452-26. One month after the 
incident, Evans was formally charged, 
and the grand jury indicted him for 
various drug offenses based on 
evidence seized from the undercover 
operation. Id. at 502, 732 A.2d at 
426. Evans moved to suppress the 
evidence, arguing that it was illegally 
seized because the earlier encounter 
with the police did not constitute an 
arrest. Id. The trial court denied the 
motion, and Evans was subsequently 
convicted. Id. at 502-03, 732 A.2d 
at 426. 
Defendant Charles Sykes-Bey 
("Sykes-Bey"), in February of 1994, 
encountered a similar undercover 
operation, during which an officer 
purchased cocaine from an individual 
who was with Sykes-Bey. Id. at 504, 
732 A.2d at 427. The undercover 
agent approached Sykes-Bey for 
drugs, but Sykes-Bey told the agent 
that he sold only "weight cocaine." 
Id. The agent, wanting to buy "dimes" 
instead, bought crack cocaine from 
Sykes-Bey's compatriot. Id. at 505, 
732 A.2d at 427. The police, 
immediately thereafter, stopped and 
searched Sykes-Bey, and seized the 
. cocaine. Id. As with Evans, the 
police did not take Sykes-Bey to the 
station house, or formally charge him 
until approximately one month later. 
Id. Sykes-Bey moved to suppress 
the seized evidence, claiming that, 
because he was not "arrested" prior 
to, or contemporaneously with the 
search, the evidence was not legally 
seized. Id. The trial court denied 
the motion and Sykes-Bey was 
convicted of various drug offenses. 
Id. at 506, 732 A.2d at 428. 
The Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland reversed both Evans's 
and Sykes-Bey's convictions, holding 
that the detention in both situations 
did not constitute an arrest, and 
therefore, the search was 
unconstitutional. Id. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari on both cases to consider 
what constitutes an arrest for 
purposes of the search incident to 
arrest exception. Id. at 506, 732 
A.2d at 428-29. 
To address the issue of whether 
Evans and Sykes-Bey were arrested 
when detained, the court first defined 
the term "arrest" as set forth in 
Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511,350 
A.2d 130 (1976). Evans, at 512, 
732 A.2d at 430-31. The court· 
observed that the Bouldin court 
defined an arrest to include the 
taking, seizing, or detaining of another 
person (1) by touching or putting 
hands on him; (2) or by any act that 
indicates an intention to take him into 
custody and that subjects him to the 
actual control and will of the person 
making the arrest; or (3) by the 
consent of the person to be arrested. 
Id. at 513, 732 A.2d at 431 (citing 
Bouldin, 276 Md. at 515-16, 350 
A.2d at 133). As to whether the 
police must intend an immediate 
prosecution to make an arrest valid, 
the court found no support in either 
Bouldin or in other Maryland case 
law requiring such intent. Id. at 513-
14, 732 A.2d at 431. The court 
therefore concluded that the intent to 
prosecute was not a prerequisite to a 
valid arrest. Id. at 514,732 A.2d at 
431. 
The court next focused on 
Sykes-Bey's contention that after 
stopping and searching a defendant, 
the police must immediately charge the 
defendant to effectuate a valid search 
incident to an arrest. Id. at 524, 732 
A.2dat436-37. Thecourtfoundno 
distinction between a "fonnal" arrest 
and a "custodial" arrest for the 
purpose of invalidating an otherwise 
constitutional search, but 
acknowledged that the terms are used 
in similar context by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and other courts. Id. The court 
further agreed with the dissenting 
opinion of the court of special appeals 
that requiring officers to immediately 
charge every person they detain to 
transform the detention into a valid 
arrest would contradict the principles 
behind the Fourth Amendment and 
violate public policy. Id. at 524, 732 
A.2d at 437. 
The court found that a lawful 
arrest requires probable cause that a 
suspect committed a crime, and a 
detention of the suspect that subjects 
him to the arresting officer's will or 
control; the intention of immediately 
charging the suspect is not required. 
Id. at 515, 732 A.2d at 432. 
Applying these elements to the facts 
in Evans, the court concluded that the 
officers had probable cause to believe 
Evans and Sykes-Bey had committed 
a crime. Id. The court further found 
that because the police detained the 
defendants in order to verify their 
identities, the defendants were 
subjected to the officers' control. Id. 
The court therefore held that the 
encounters between the police and the 
defendants constituted valid arrests. 
Id. 
The court, having found the 
arrests valid, then detennined whether 
the searches incident to the arrests 
were valid. Id. at 516, 732 A.2d at 
432-34. The court reviewed the 
long-standing rule that arresting 
officers may validly search suspects 
incident to an arrest for weapons that 
may endanger an officer's safety, and 
for evidence of the crime that may be 
vulnerable to destruction. Id. at 517, 
732 A.2d at 432-33 (citing Us. v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225-26 
(1973); Chimel v. California, 396 
U.S. 752(1969)). The officer's initial 
probable cause for arresting the 
suspects, according to the court, is 
sufficient for a search incident to the 
arrests; the officer does not need any 
additional suspicion to believe the 
suspect has weapons or evidence. 
Id. at516-17, 732 A.2dat433 (citing 
Us. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
225-26 (1973)). 
The Evans court, 
acknowledging that its justifications 
and requirements for a valid search 
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incident to arrest may not be identical 
to those under the Fourth 
Amendment, determined that its 
holding incorporates the fimdamental 
factors. Id. at 519-20, 732 A.2d at 
434 (citing Knowles v. Iowa, U.S., 
119 S. Ct. 484 (1998)). The court 
cited several Maryland cases applying 
the Fourth Amendment rule that 
warrantless searches incident to arrest 
are valid for the purpose of uncovering 
weapons and evidence. Id. at 517-
19, 732 A.2d at 433-34. Therefore, 
the court concluded that because the 
arrests of Evans and Sykes-Bey were 
lawful, the searches incident to the 
arrests were valid. Id. at 23-24,732 
A.2d at 434. 
The holding by the Court of 
Appeals in State v. Evans that an 
arrest is constitutional even if the 
police have no intention of 
immediately charging the suspect 
comports with both prior Maryland 
and federal constitutional 
jurisprudence. By not including the 
formal charging process as a 
requirement for a valid arrest, the 
court in State v. Evans created a 
wider range of situations that may be 
deemed valid arrests. Accordingly, 
searches incident to such arrests will 
also be lawful. This rule allows 
prosecutors to choose carefully which 
suspects to charge by first examining 
the strength of the evidence obtained 
from the search. As a result, suspects 
may be subjected to fewer 
unnecessary formal arrests and 
charging procedures. With fewer 
defendants in the system, court 
dockets and attorneys' caseloads will 
be less burdensome, resulting in a 
more efficient criminal justice system. 
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